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Abstract: 1 in 7 Americans received assistance from SNAP in FY2012, which is a rate 141
percent higher than in FY2000, but only 59 percent higher than in FY1980. In this chapter I
describe the socioeconomic and policy climate in recent decades that had bearing on SNAP
participation, along with a formal empirical analysis of those determinants and detailed
simulations of the relative contributions of the economy, policy, and demographics to changes in
SNAP participation over time. The results suggest that SNAP is operating effectively as an
automatic fiscal stabilizer—nearly 50 percent of the increase in participation from 2007-2011 is
due to the weak economy—but policy reforms expanding access and benefit generosity also
affected participation, accounting for nearly 30 percent of the increase after the Great Recession.
The changing demographics of the American household are helping restrain growth in SNAP.

* I thank Sarah Burns and Robert Paul Hartley for excellent research assistance, and for
comments by Jonathan Schwabish, Tim Smeeding, and participants at the UKCPR/IRP
Conference Five Decades of Food Stamps on an earlier version. The opinions expressed are
solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any sponsoring agency.
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Since its inception fifty years ago, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) has become a central component of the social safety net in the United States. The
program is unique in its status as something akin to a universal entitlement; that is, subject to
meeting low-income and asset tests, the program does not impose restrictions on eligibility based
on age (Social Security), family structure (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, TANF), or
work history (Disability Insurance and Unemployment Insurance). Today, 1 in 7 Americans
receive assistance from SNAP at a cost approaching $80 billion in FY2012, making it the second
largest means-tested transfer in terms of cost after Medicaid. For much of its first three decades
SNAP operated in the shadows of the safety net, both in terms of a policy or research interest,
especially in comparison to politically contentious programs like TANF and more expensive
programs like Medicaid. What has caught the attention of policymakers and researchers alike in
recent years is the rapid growth of the program. Since FY2000, the number participating has
increased 171 percent and inflation-adjusted spending by 286 percent. 1 This has led to calls for
programmatic reforms, ranging from the 2013 House Bill H.R. 3102 that would cut $39 billion
over the next decade to wholesale decentralization in the form of a block grant to states with
additional work requirements similar to TANF (Secretaries Innovation Group 2013).
The aim of this chapter is to document the factors underlying the evolution of program
participation since 1980. 2 I emphasize three major points in my analysis: changes in the
macroeconomy, both cyclical forces from the labor market and secular trends in income

1

Author’s calculations based on administrative SNAP data at http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/SNAPsummary.htm and
the personal consumption expenditure deflator (Table B-7 of the 2013 Economic Report of the President
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/erp2013/ERP2013_Appendix_B.pdf ).
2
Prior to the Food Stamp Act of 1977, which was implemented in 1979, recipients of assistance faced a so-called
purchase requirement, meaning that they were required to spend up to their normal expenditure on food to buy
stamps, and then to receive a “bonus” amount of stamps based on income level to bring their food spending up to the
level of the USDA low-cost diet. Because many low-income families face binding liquidity constraints and were
unable to purchase stamps up front, the purchase requirement was believed to have artificially depressed
participation (Caswell and Yaktine 2013). Thus I focus on the period after the 1977 Act.
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inequality; changes in public policies, both food and nonfood related; and shifting demographics
of the American household. I begin by describing the socioeconomic and policy climate in
recent decades that had bearing on SNAP participation, followed by a formal empirical analysis
of those determinants and detailed simulations of the relative contributions of the economy,
policy, and demographics to changes in SNAP participation over time. 3
THE ECONOMY
The rush to cut or reform SNAP may be misplaced if growth in the program is primarily
due to the weak labor market and economy over the past decade. There is extensive research
evidence that SNAP functions effectively as an automatic fiscal stabilizer, meaning that as the
economy and market incomes fall during recessions participation in SNAP “automatically” rises
to smooth consumption and as market incomes rise during economic expansions participation
falls (Wallace and Blank 1999; Blundell and Pistaferri 2003; Gundersen and Ziliak 2003; Ziliak,
et al. 2003; Bitler and Hoynes 2010; Klerman and Danielson 2011; Ganong and Liebman 2013).
This suggests that as the macroeconomy improves in coming years, participation and cost of
SNAP will decline. Indeed, assuming no changes in law, the Congressional Budget Office
(2012) projected that by 2022 spending on SNAP would fall 23 percent because of improving
labor market conditions.
That such a countercyclical link exists seems transparent in Figure 1, which depicts
trends in aggregate SNAP participation and seasonally-adjusted unemployment rates. 4

3

I do not cover issues related to process implementation of SNAP reforms, which may have also affected the
caseload over the past decade. See, for example, Rowe, et al. (2010) and Hurley, et al. (2013).
4
Unless noted otherwise, all data come from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current
Population Survey for calendar years 1980-2011. In the CPS all persons in a household are assigned as a SNAP
recipient even if only a subset receives benefits. The assumption is that members of households pool resources, so
even though not all members are direct beneficiaries, indirectly they do benefit from extra resources. This will
overstate actual participation, but this is weighed against evidence of under-reporting of SNAP receipt in household
surveys (Bollinger and David 1997; Wheaton 2007; Meyer and Goerge 2011). It also misses the fact that a
household may consist of multiple SNAP units. The appendix describes the data and elaborates on these issues.
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Highlighted in the figure are years that include a macroeconomic recession as defined by the
National Bureau of Economic Research. It is clear that peaks in SNAP usage coincide (perhaps
with a lag) with peaks in unemployment rates over the past three decades. A simple time-series
regression of SNAP participation on the unemployment rate and a linear trend yields:
� 𝑡 = 3.47 + 0.86 ∗ 𝑈𝑅𝑡 + 0.01 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑, 𝑅 2 = 0.57,
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃
(1.03) (0.13)
(0.02)

(1)

where standard errors are reported in parentheses. The r-squared of 0.57 says that
unemployment rates explain nearly 60 percent of the variation in aggregate SNAP participation
(the trend adds nothing to the model). The coefficient on the unemployment rates implies that
for each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, SNAP increases by 0.86 points, or
almost 10 percent on the average SNAP participation rate of 9.2 percent over the 1980 to 2011
period. While this time-series model is simply illustrative, a robust link between the business
cycle and SNAP participation remains even in a more fully specified model as estimated below.
[Figures 1 and 2 here]
Concomitant with large swings in unemployment rates, there has also been a sizable
secular shift in the distribution of earnings and income that may bear on SNAP participation in
recent decades (Piketty and Saez 2003; Autor, et al. 2008; Burkhauser, et al. 2012). Figure 2
depicts trends in real median household income as well as the ratio of the 90th percentile of real
income to the 10th percentile of real income. The median is a robust measure of the center of a
skewed distribution such as income that is used to signify how the “typical” household is faring,
and the 90-10 ratio is a standard measure of inequality. Since 1980 real median income has
increased 22 percent to $52,000, while 90-10 inequality increased 30 percent. However, unlike
the expansions of the 1980s and 1990s, which each had peaks in income in excess of the prior
cycle, median income at the peak of the 2000s cycle was no greater than the 1990s, and in fact
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by 2011 any gains in median income since 1999 were lost. The flattening out of median income
from 2000 to 2007, followed by a sharp decline in the Great Recession, coincides with a sharp
increase in income inequality. The latter was driven both by continued increases in income at
the top, coupled with significant declines in income at the bottom of the distribution.
POLICY REFORMS
Basic eligibility for SNAP benefits is determined by having monthly gross income below
130 percent of the poverty guideline for a given household size and monthly net income (gross
income less deductions) may not exceed 100 percent of that guideline (households with an
elderly or disabled person are exempt from the gross income test). The guideline is the same for
the 48 lower contiguous states and the District of Columbia, and slightly higher for residents of
Alaska and Hawaii. If net income is zero then the recipient qualifies for the maximum benefit,
which likewise varies by the size of the SNAP household but is the same nationally except for
Alaska and Hawaii. If net income is positive then the monthly benefit is reduced by 30 percent
for every dollar of net income because the household is expected to contribute up to 30 percent
of their other income to food. Generally benefits were set at 100 percent of the Thrifty Food Plan
(TFP) and increased annually based on changes in the price of food used in constructing the TFP,
though there were deviations from this from 1988-1996 when they were set at 103 percent of the
TFP, and again since 2009 when they were set at 113.6 percent of the TFP and not adjusted for
inflation afterwards. Currently the minimum monthly benefit is $16, though for much of the past
few decades it was $10. In addition to the two income tests there is both a liquid asset test of
$2,000 ($3,250 for households with a disabled person or someone age 60 or older) and a vehicle
value test of $4,650, although as noted below several states have raised or waived asset and
vehicle tests. Historically federal law required recipients to recertify for benefits at least
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annually (sooner if there was a change in household or income status) and every two years if the
household contained a disabled person or a senior, although there was the option for states to
assign shorter recertification periods (Kabbani and Wilde 2003). The other path to participation
is through “categorical eligibility,” which typically applies to TANF and SSI recipients who
automatically qualify for SNAP.
There was little change in basic eligibility rules in the nearly two decades leading up to
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, aka
welfare reform). Welfare reform, however, had both a direct and indirect policy effect on SNAP.
Directly, it eliminated eligibility for most legal permanent aliens unless they had at least 10 years
of work experience or were veterans; it eliminated benefits for convicted drug felons; it limited
benefits to three months out of any 36-month period for able-bodied adults without dependents
(ABAWDS) between the ages of 18 and 50 working less than 20 hours per week or not meeting
other work requirements; it reduced the maximum benefit and froze many deductions used in
calculating net income; it allowed states to sanction individuals and households for
noncompliance with TANF requirements or child support payments; and it mandated that states
adopt the Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) replacing paper coupons with debit cards (Gabor
and Botsko 1998; Gleason, et a. 2001). Indirectly participation was affected by virtue of the fact
that half of the food stamp caseload was categorically eligible for stamps via their receipt of
TANF benefits, and as welfare reform pulled people off of TANF they also dropped receipt of
food stamps, at least temporarily (Ziliak, et al. 2003). The other policy change that indirectly
affected SNAP, even prior to welfare reform (note that in Figure 1 participation started to fall
three years before PRWORA), was the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
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starting in 1993 that pulled scores of single mothers into the labor force, and off welfare and food
stamps (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001).
As participation in SNAP plummeted over 40 percent from 1993 to 2000, so too did the
take-up rate of benefits; that is, the fraction of eligible persons participating fell over 25 percent
to just over 50 percent (Leftin, et al. 2011). A decline in participation does not have to be
associated with a decline in take-up because the decline in participation could occur only among
those no longer eligible. Take-up rates among eligible seniors has always been low (30-35
percent depending on year), and the decline in take-up after 1993 was driven mainly by children
and nonelderly adults (Cunnyngham 2002). The fall in take-up, which is likely a spillover effect
of former TANF recipients also leaving food stamps even though they remained eligible, was
met with alarm (and controversy) in policy circles.
In response several new initiatives aimed at program outreach and eligibility expansion
were introduced, and in some cases codified in the Farm Bills of 2002 and 2008, giving much
more discretion to the states to improve take-up and program administration. 5 These included
liberalizing vehicle asset tests, such as exempting one or more vehicles from the test; expanding
(broad-based) categorical eligibility, which allowed states to utilize more generous TANF asset
and gross-income tests to determine eligibility; restoring eligibility for legal aliens previously
excluded by PRWORA; expanding the option for simplified reporting, which allowed states to
relax the frequency and form (i.e. phone or online) of benefit recertification; and outreach via
advertising campaigns. 6 Not all of the reforms were intended to make access easier.
Specifically in the 1990s states responded to financial incentives offered by USDA to reduce
5

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) also affected SNAP by raising the maximum
benefit guarantee by an average of 13.6 percent, raising the minimum benefit from $14 to $16, and suspending the
time limit of receipt among ABAWDs (http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/supplementalnutrition-assistance-program-(snap)/arra.aspx#.Uh3u6Rtebmc ).
6
See http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/applicant_recipients/eligibility.htm
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benefit error rates by requiring more frequent certification, especially in households with
workers, such that by 2000 36 percent of working households faced 3 month or less
recertification intervals, up from 4.7 percent in 1992 (Kabbani and Wilde 2003). Some of the
simplified reporting requirements adopted in recent years were intended to offset the hardship
associated with more frequent certification. Another policy that restricted access is fingerprint
imaging and facial recognition software.
[Table 1 here]
Table 1 summarizes changes in the number of states (and DC) adopting various SNAP
policy options between 2000 and 2011 based on information in the Economic Research Service’s
SNAP Policy Database. 7 By 2011 41 states implemented broad-based categorical eligibility as a
mechanism to join SNAP, compared to only 2 states in 2000, and of those 41 states 38 elected to
eliminate the SNAP liquid asset test as part of broad-based eligibility. The number of states
offering call centers, phone applications, and combined application processes with other transfer
programs has exploded, along with the number offering simplified reporting and exempting
vehicle assets. As of 2011 49 states utilized simplified reporting, and 45 states exempt all vehicle
assets from resources in determining eligibility for SNAP. At the same time, states pulled back
from imposing short recertification windows of 1-3 months, and restored SNAP eligibility to
more noncitizens, especially children.
In the aftermath of the 1996 welfare reform there was a flurry of research focused on
understanding the relative roles of the macroeconomy and policy on declining food stamp
caseloads. Wallace and Blank (1999) attributed about 44 percent of the decline to the
strengthening economy, and about 6 percent to welfare reform. Figlio, Gundersen, and Ziliak

7

SNAP Policy Database, Economic Research Service, USDA http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/snap-policydatabase.aspx#.Uh3oARtebmc .
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(2000) reached similar conclusions in terms of the role of the economy, but ascribed a negligible
role to welfare reform. Gleason, et al. (2001) found that 47 percent of the decline was due to the
economy, and about 26 percent to welfare reform. And in a recent re-evaluation of that period
Klerman and Danielson (2011) found that 31 percent of the 1994-2000 decline resulted from
lower unemployment rates and about 13 percent from welfare reform. In short, the consensus
was that the economy mattered by a factor of 2 to 3 more than policy for the latter 1990s decline
in food stamps.
Additionally several studies have examined various aspects of specific food policy
reforms on SNAP caseloads, both for the 1990s and 2000s (Figlio, et al. 2000; Gleason, et al.
2001; Ziliak, et al. 2003; Kabbani and Wilde 2003; Bartlett, et al. 2004; Ratcliffe, et al. 2007;
Burstein, et al. 2009; Mabli and Ferrerosa 2010; Klerman and Danielson 2011; Dickert-Conlin,
et al. 2011; Ganong and Liebman 2013). There seems to be some consensus that short
recertification periods reduced SNAP participation in the 1990s, and that broad-based categorical
eligibility and simplified reporting led to higher caseloads. There is limited evidence that
expanded outreach leads to higher caseloads (Dickert-Conlin et al. 2011), while fingerprinting
results in lower caseloads (Burstein, et al. 2004; Ratcliffe, et al. 2007). The evidence is
decidedly mixed whether the introduction of the EBT, allowing ABAWD waivers, or vehicle
asset expansions have affected caseloads.
A few recent studies have updated the 1990s economy versus policy debate to identify
the relative contributions of each to understanding the post-2000 increase in SNAP participation.
Mabli and Ferrerosa (2010), focusing on 2000 to 2008, ascribe 55 percent of the increase in
SNAP to economic factors and 20 percent to the food policy reforms. Klerman and Danielson
(2011) find a much lower effect of the economy of 27 percent of the caseload increase from 2000
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to 2009, and 16 percent to food policy and 6 percent to welfare reform. Ganong and Leibman
(2013), zeroing in on the post Great Recession increase in SNAP from 2007-2011, attribute
about two-thirds of the growth to the weak economy and about 7.6 percent to food policy
changes. Mulligan (2012), on the other hand, argues that just over 20 percent of the increase was
due to expanded policy, and Mulligan (2013) finds that two-thirds of the $122 increase in
spending per capita from 2007-2011 was due to the increased generosity of SNAP benefits and
related policies like broad-based categorical eligibility. Thus, unlike the 1990s decline, there is
less consensus on whether the economy or policy drove the increase in participation in the 2000s.
CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS
There have been important demographic shifts in the U.S. population over the past
several decades that could differentially affect the size of the SNAP caseload, participation rates
among subpopulations, and the attendant composition of the caseload. On the one hand, the
aging of the population suggests that the composition of the caseload should be aging as well.
However, because take-up rates among seniors are so much lower than adults and children, this
should put downward pressure on the growth of the caseload and thus it is not clear a priori
whether the age distribution of the caseload is likely to change due to population aging. Indeed,
because of the decline in marriage the fraction of births to unwed mothers accelerated from 15
percent of live births in 1980 to 40 percent by the mid 2000s (Cancian and Reed 2009; Carlson
and England 2011), and as single mother families are more likely to be poor, then it is entirely
possible that the caseload could be getting larger and younger at the same time. A similar trend
toward a younger, larger caseload could emerge from the growth of the Hispanic population,
who all else equal tend to be younger, lower income, and with larger family sizes (Landale, et al.
2006). Another secular trend placing upward pressure on the size of the SNAP caseload is the
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significant growth of disability, both in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social
Security Disability Income (SSDI) programs (Muller, et al. 2006; Autor 2011). Households in
which all residents receive SSI automatically qualify for SNAP, but SSDI households and those
SSI units where some receive disability and others do not still must meet income and asset
restrictions.
[Figures 3 and 4 here]
Figure 3 presents trends in the age composition of households receiving SNAP for
children under age 18, for adults age 18 to 59, and for seniors age 60 and older. The age 60
threshold for seniors is consistent with SNAP policy for eligibility determination. The figure
shows that in any given year the participation rate among children is double the rate of adults,
and triple that of seniors. However, the decline in participation among children and adults
during the welfare era (1993-2000) was substantially higher than among the elderly (46 and 48
percent, respectively, compared to 30 percent), but the subsequent growth from 2000-2011 was
also higher for those two groups compared to the elderly (95, 138, and 75 percent, respectively).
Combined, in Figure 4 these changes over the past decade have resulted in a shift in the age
composition of households receiving SNAP away from children and elderly and toward adults.
In all years prior to the Great Recession about 55 percent of SNAP households consisted of
children and the elderly, but by 2009, a slim majority were nonelderly adults. 8
Coincident with the shift in the age composition of households with SNAP is the shift in
the composition towards smaller households and those with multi-generations. Figure 5 shows
that beginning in the welfare reform era there has been a secular decline in the fraction of SNAP

8

It is important to recall that the definition of a SNAP household in the CPS differs from the SNAP unit in SNAP
Quality Control Data. In the former a household includes recipients and nonrecipients, but in the latter it is only
recipients. As a consequence, in QC data a majority of recipients are still children and the elderly (54 percent in
2011 (Strayer, et al. 2012).
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households containing 3 or more persons, and a rise in the fraction of 1-person and 2-person
SNAP households. At the same time, households receiving SNAP, like the general population,
are increasingly likely to contain multiple generations as seen in Figure 6. 9 A multi-generation
household is one that contains two or more adult generations, with or without a grandchild, or a
grandparent and grandchild household (“skipped generations”). The upward pressure in multigeneration households stems more from the addition of adults to the household than children,
which is consistent with the trend toward more 2-person SNAP households.
[Figures 5 and 6 here]
A possible concern with the shift toward smaller, prime-age adult households is that it
may coincide with an increasing fraction of the SNAP caseload headed by individuals out of the
labor force. A more welfare-only reliant population could affect public support for SNAP in light
of the centrality of work requirements and time limits that fundamentally altered the TANF
program during welfare reform (Ziliak 2009). In fact, Figure 7 shows that the share of SNAP
households headed by a person out of the labor force has been very stable for the past two
decades, averaging about 53 percent. The growth has been most rapid among full-time, full-year
workers, as well as part-time, full-years workers. In other words, the heads of an increasing
share of SNAP households have a very strong attachment to the labor force. Furthermore, Figure
8 shows that the fraction SNAP households headed by a high school dropout has plummeted by
more than half to under 30 percent since 1980, and by 2011 more than a third of SNAP
households were headed by someone with some college or more. 10 Figure 9, which depicts the
distribution of SNAP households by household income in relation to the federal poverty

9

Beginning in 1988 the CPS adopted an improved method of identifying grandchildren and grandparents in
households, and thus the jump after 1987 reflects the change in survey design.
10
The CPS changed the measurement of education attainment after calendar year 1990 and thus the jump in some
college in the two years after owes in part to the change in the questionnaire.
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guideline given the household size, shows that since the mid 1980s the composition of SNAP
households has trended toward those with annual incomes above the poverty line. This suggests
that SNAP has evolved into a work supplement for educated, near-poor households.
[Figures 7-9 here]
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: ACCOUNTING FOR THE RISE IN SNAP
I now re-examine in a more formal setting the relative roles of the economy and policy
(food and non-food) in accounting for SNAP participation over time, and in a new twist I also
isolate the contribution of changing demographics. The empirical framework is the standard
reduced-form setup as
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛾 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡 𝛿 + 𝜋𝑗 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,

(2)

where 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an indicator equal to 1 if anyone in household i residing in state j in time t
receives SNAP, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of household demographics, 𝑍𝑗𝑡 is a vector of state by year

economic and policy variables, 𝜋𝑗 is a set of indicators for each state, 𝜑𝑡 is a set of indicators for
each year, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a random error term. For the model I restrict attention to the household

head, and thus do not include multiple observations from the same family. I estimate equation
(2) via least squares, which means the linear probability standard errors must be corrected for
heteroskedasticity. In addition, since much of the focus is on the economic and policy variables
at the state level, I also cluster the standard errors by state to account for the within-state
autocorrelation arising from the fact that multiple households are present in each state. 11
The demographic controls include indicators for the head’s age (over age 75 is the
omitted group), education attainment (relative to high school dropout), race (relative to white),

11

In results not tabulated I also estimated the standard errors that clustered both by state and year as suggested by
Cameron, et al. (2011). The standard errors were little changed, but there were violations of full column rank in the
variance matrix so I only report results that cluster at the state level.
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Hispanic ethnicity, household size, number of related children under age 18, and indicators
whether the household is multigenerational, headed by a woman, headed by a married person, or
residing in a metro area. Because participation is means-tested I do not include household
earnings or non-SNAP income in the demographics to avoid potential endogeneity.
The measures of the macroeconomy that vary by state and year include the
unemployment rate, real median household income, and the ratio of 90/10 real income. Given the
apparent lag in SNAP participation to changes in unemployment in Figure 1, in some of the
specifications I allow a two-year lag in state unemployment rates (Figlio, et al 2000; Klerman
and Danielson 2011; Ganong and Liebman 2013). 12
The non-food policy variables include the real value of the maximum of the Federal or
state minimum wage in a given year, the phase-in subsidy rate for the EITC, an indicator variable
if the state has a separate EITC program, an indicator if the state ever implemented a federallyapproved waiver from its AFDC program between 1992 and 1996, and an indicator for when the
state implemented its TANF program. Because some state’s set their minimum wage above the
Federal wage and others below, I use the maximum of the two as a proxy for wage incentives to
work. Thus, a higher minimum wage is expected to lower participation. The EITC subsidy rate,
since it makes work relatively more attractive, is expected also to lower participation. The same
is true of a state’s EITC supplement. Even though it is set nationally, the EITC subsidy rate is
identified by the fact that it varies over time and by the number of qualifying children (Hotz and
Scholz 2003). 13 While some of the waiver and TANF policies were designed to make it more
attractive to combine welfare and work, e.g. higher earnings disregards and asset limits, on net
12

In an earlier version I also examined whether the effect of the economy on SNAP participation differed across
decades. There was some evidence that unemployment had a larger effect in the 1990s than the 1980s, but there was
no difference from the 2000s. These estimates are available upon request.
13
The CPS does not document whether a child in the household qualifies for the EITC, and thus I proxy this by the
number of related children under age 18.
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most of the policies made AFDC/TANF participation less attractive and thus both the AFDC
waiver and TANF indicators are expected to lower participation in SNAP.
For the SNAP policy variables I assign the real maximum benefit guarantee for a 1, 2, 3,
or 4 person household based on family size (the 4-person guarantee is assigned to households
with 4 or more persons) to measure the financial generosity of the program. Thus, the higher the
guarantee the higher is the expected participation in SNAP. Like the EITC subsidy rate, the
SNAP benefit is identified in the model because it varies over time and by household size. 14 For
the remaining SNAP variables I utilize the SNAP Policy Database assembled by the Economic
Research Service in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These variables, which vary across
states and time, include the fraction of SNAP dollars redeemed via the EBT, indicators for
whether the state allows broad-based categorical eligibility, whether the state operates call
centers (either statewide or partial state), whether the state allows combined SSI/SNAP
applications, whether it imposes short recertification periods of 3 months or less for households
with a working member, whether noncitizens are eligible for benefits, whether the household
must be fingerprinted (either statewide or partial state), whether the household is disqualified for
being sanctioned by another program such as TANF, whether the state allows online applications
(either statewide or partial state), whether the state adopted simplified reporting, whether it
excludes the full value of a vehicle for eligibility, and the real spending on outreach. The
expected signs on these variables are all intuitive, and reflect the series of carrots and sticks that
states have adopted in administering their SNAP programs. Finally, to proxy for state variation
in politics, I include an indicator variable whether the governor of the state is a Democrat, and

14

As discussed earlier the maximum benefit is generally tied to inflation of the food prices in the TFP, but the
benefit also deviated from the TFP between 1988 and 1996, and from 2009-2011, providing non-inflation policy
variation for identification.
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expect the sign on the coefficient to be positive suggesting that Democratic governors create
policy environment more support of SNAP participation. 15
[Table 2 here]
Table 2 presents linear probability estimates of the effect of the economy, policy, and
demographics on SNAP household participation weighted by the CPS ASEC household weight.
In column (1) the only measure of the economy is the state unemployment rate, where the
estimate of 0.41 says that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a
0.41 point increase in SNAP participation, or about 5.3 percent on the average SNAP household
participation rate of 7.6 percent from 1980-2011. This effect of unemployment is about one-half
the size from the time-series regression reported in equation (1), indicating that the time-series
model attributed too much to the economy once one controls for policy and demographics in the
pooled cross-sectional models of equation (2). 16 In column (2) when we add controls for state
median income and income inequality the effect of the business cycle is attenuated by about 27
percent, although once we admit a two-year lagged effect of the unemployment rate in column
(3) the total effect of the business cycle of 0.38 points nearly returns to the baseline estimate.
Columns (2) and (3) show that increases in the real median income lead to modest reductions in
SNAP participation, while increases in inequality lead to more economically substantive
increases. A unit increase in inequality leads to a 0.26 point increase in SNAP participation.
The next panel of Table 2 contains the estimates of the nonfood policy variables.
Expansions of the EITC subsidy rate over the past 30 years had an economically and statistically
important disincentive effect on SNAP participation—each percentage point increase in the

15

Although the District of Columbia is not a state and has no governor, I set the governor is a Democrat variable to
1 for all years for DC residents based on past voting of residents for local government.
16
The average SNAP participation rates differ between equations (1) and (2) because in the former the outcome is
persons participating and in the latter it is households.
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subsidy rate reduces SNAP participation by 0.1 points, or about 1.3 percent at the mean level of
SNAP usage. Given the 20 percentage point increase in the subsidy rate for 2 qualifying children
in the mid 1990s suggests that increased EITC generosity had a substantive effect on reductions
in SNAP during that period. SNAP participation, holding other factors constant, is at least a
percentage point lower after implementation of TANF, suggesting an important spillover effect
of welfare reform onto the SNAP caseload.
The third panel of Table 2 presents estimates of the food policy variables. Each $100
increase in the real maximum benefit guarantee leads to a 1.9 point increase. Evaluated at the
means of the data the elasticity of SNAP participation with respect to the benefit guarantee is
0.88, which means that the 13.6 percent increase in benefits as part of ARRA is expected to
increase participation 12.2 percent. 17 On the converse, with the expiration of the ARRA benefit
increase in October 2013, participation is expected to fall by the same magnitude. Across the
various other policy variables only a few have a consistent economic and statistical effect on
participation. Broad-based categorical eligibility and simplified reporting are each associated
with increases in SNAP participation. States that have adopted these policies have SNAP
participation rates that are 0.6 and 0.8 points higher, respectively. At the same time, if the state
requires fingerprinting of its recipients then participation is about 0.7 points lower (columns 2
and 3). Outreach spending has the unexpected sign of reducing participation, though the
magnitude is very small. 18

17

As a comparison, Nord and Prell (2011) estimate that the expanded ARRA benefit lowered food insecurity by 2.2
percentage points among low-income households, or about 8.8 percent on the baseline rate of 25 percent.
18
A detailed examination of the food policy variables was carried out to explore whether the “kitchen sink”
approach here was eliminating economic and statistical significance due to collinearity of the policy variables. The
short answer is no. Sequentially adding food policy variables or combinations of food policy variables to the
baseline set of the maximum benefit, broad-based categorical eligibility, simplified reporting, and fingerprinting did
not alter the conclusion that most of the variables are not significant, but they do add to the model in the sense that
some of them sharpen the effect of the four consistently significant variables. I also examined whether stopping the
analysis in 2006 similar to Ganong and Liebman (2013) made a difference. The argument is that the Great
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The next panel of Table 2 contains the estimated effects of demographic variables. There
is evidence that SNAP participation significantly declines with age and with education
attainment. White households are less likely to participate relative to African Americans and
members of other races, as are non-Hispanics. Conditional on the number of related children in
the household, participation declines in household size. Participation is also about 4 points lower
in households that do not contain multiple generations. Finally, participation is higher among
female-headed households by about 4 points, and lower among married households by almost 9
points and among those in metro areas compared to nonmetro areas. 19
[Table 3 here]
In Table 3 I attempt to summarize the relative influence of the economy, policy and
demographics through a series of counterfactual simulations. Specifically I use the model
estimates presented in column (3) of Table 2 to examine how much of the increase in SNAP
from 2007-2011, 2000-2011, and 1980-2011 can be attributed to economic forces, changes in
non-food policies, changes in food policies, and changes in household demographics if each of
the four groupings was held fixed group-by-group at the values at the start of the simulation
period. For example, to assess the role of the economy in accounting for the increase in SNAP
after the Great Recession from 2007-2011, I fix the unemployment rate and its lags, real median
income, and real 90-10 income inequality at their 2007 levels and let the remaining variables

Recession may have changed the relationship between the regressors and SNAP participation. Doing so had no
impact on the effect of demographics or the economy on SNAP. The before-TANF welfare variable was slightly
stronger, and the effects of broad-based categorical eligibility and simplified reporting were weaker by stopping the
analysis in 2006. The only variable that changed direction is outreach spending, which becomes positive and
significant. None of these changes had an effect on the counterfactual simulations reported in Table 3.
19
I also estimated unweighted versions of equation (2). The qualitative results are unchanged, but there are some
differences in the magnitudes a few of the coefficients. For example, the effects of median income and inequality are
stronger in the unweighted models, as are the effects of broad-based categorical eligibility, fingerprinting, and
simplified reporting. This has limited effect on the simulation results. Likewise I estimated models restricting
attention to those heads with a high school diploma or less in a bid to focus on a population at ex ante greater risk of
SNAP use. Again, none of the qualitative results change.
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change over time, including the year effects. I then examine the 2000-2011 change by fixing the
economic variables at their 2000 level, and finally the 1980-2011 change in SNAP by fixing the
economy at the 1980 values. This same exercise is conducted for each of the four variable
groupings.
From 2007-2011, the participation of households in SNAP increased 68.7 percent. If we
fixed the economic variables at their 2007 values, we would have predicted that SNAP
participation would have increased only 35.8 percent. This implies that changes in the business
cycle and income distribution accounted for 47.8 percent (=100*(1-35.8/68.7)) of the change
over the four-year period after the Great Recession began. While only 1.6 percent of the increase
was due to non-food policies, a substantive 28.5 percent was due to changes in Federal and state
food policies. Changing demographics explain none of the increase in SNAP participation, and
in fact, the negative number suggests that changes in demographics after 2007 actually helped
dampen SNAP growth because caseloads were predicted to be even higher than actual.
The middle panel of Table 3 shows that after 2000 household participation in SNAP more
than doubled. If the economic variables were fixed at their 2000 values then participation was
predicted to only increase by 58.4 percent, or that the economy accounts for a sizable 45.4
percent of the actual change in participation. We also see that food policies have a more
prominent role in the post-2000 period, accounting for 35 percent of the growth. Finally, in the
bottom panel we look back over the prior 32 years and see that changing unemployment rates
along with the income distribution account for 37 percent of the one-third increase in SNAP
participation. However, food policies take center stage with a substantial 76.2 percent of the
growth; whereas, nonfood policies such as EITC expansions and welfare reform have kept SNAP
participation in check, as have changing demographics of the American household.
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CONCLUSION
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is under the policy microscope as the
current Congress debates whether and how to trim funding of the program in the coming decade.
The case made to cut the program is based on concerns over the rapid growth in the past decade,
both in terms of number of persons served and total cost. However, the evidence presented here
suggests that the greatest factor underlying the increase in participation after the Great
Recession, and indeed since 2000, is the weak macroeconomy characterized by higher
unemployment, lower incomes, and widening inequality. The estimate that the economy
accounts for nearly one-half of the increase from 2007-2011 is smaller than the two-thirds
estimate reported in Ganong and Liebman (2013), most likely due to my inclusion of detailed
controls for demographics and the income distribution which depress the effect of unemployment
on SNAP. Even though each study uses different samples and methodologies, however, the
common result is that the economy is the most important factor driving short-run changes in
participation. That is, the program is operating as intended as an automatic fiscal stabilizer
during this extended period of economic distress facing households in the U.S. Indeed,
descriptive evidence points to growth in participation over the past dozen years among full-time,
year-round workers, those with some college education, and those with household incomes
between one and two times the federal poverty guideline. In other words, the program is
increasingly operating as a work support for higher educated, but low-income households, not
unlike the EITC, while still maintaining its universal entitlement to disadvantaged children and
seniors, and the disabled.
The results also show that policy matters, as do demographics, especially in the long
run. To be sure there have been some recent changes in program eligibility such as broad-based
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categorical eligibility and simplified reporting that have led to significant increases in SNAP
participation over the past decade. These programmatic changes were implemented in a bid to
stem the tide of declining take-up rates in the late 1990s and to improve program efficiency, and
the prime facie evidence suggests they have largely worked. Take-up rates have rebounded to
levels at or above those in the early 1990s (Leftin, et al. 2011), while administrative error rates
from over-issuance and under-issuance of benefits have declined by over half since 2000. 20 The
CBO (2012) estimates that eliminating broad-based categorical eligibility as proposed in HR Bill
1947 so that all recipients face SNAP income and asset limits will reduce SNAP participation by
4.3 percent from 2013 to 2022. Presumably this will lead to a deterioration of program integrity,
and to a reduction in the fraction of SNAP recipients who combine work with SNAP as those
persons admitted by these rules tend to be the working near- poor. In addition, the estimates
presented suggest that the expiration of the temporary ARRA boost in benefits of 13.6 percent in
October 2013 is predicted to reduce participation by just over 12 percent. So with continued
improvements in the economy and return of benefits to pre-ARRA levels, SNAP participation
should begin to fall as projected by the CBO.
Over the long run, SNAP policies have loomed larger as a determinant of participation
than the economy, and this is not surprising since basic program parameters and eligibility rules
can shape the size and composition of the caseload more than in the short run. The estimates
here clearly point in the direction of lower participation and program cost because of the aging of
the population, fewer children and smaller households, the ongoing shift to cities from rural
areas, among other demographic forces. This suggests that if policy reforms are on the horizon
they should be framed within the context of the changing demographics of the U.S. household
20

Author’s calculations using total errors rates produced by the Food and Nutrition Service from SNAP Quality
Control Data at http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/qc/pdfs/2011-rates.pdf and
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/qc/pdfs/2000-rates.pdf.
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and be targeted to long-run dimensions of the program and not in response to short-run changes
in participation. Terminating eligibility until the recovery has had a chance to fully gain traction
will likely be premature and expose vulnerable families to even greater economic risk.
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DATA APPENDIX
The primary data source used in the analysis comes from the Annual Social and
Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey for calendar years 1980-2011. I do not
delete any observations for any reason, including those individuals with imputed responses by
the Census Bureau. This results in 5,552,486 individuals residing in 2,053,018 households
pooled across all years, or about 173,515 persons in a typical year across the sample period.
Figures 1, 3, and 4 of the text rely on individual-level data, while Figures 2, and 5-9, along with
Tables 2 and 3 utilize household-level information.
Figure 1 in the text is the weighted fraction of the noninstitutionalized population that
participates in SNAP, where the weight is the individual weight assigned by the Census Bureau
that adjusts for the stratified sample design. The Census question for SNAP receipt (HFOODSP)
is
“Did anyone in this household get food stamps at any time during [19XX/20XX]
(last year)?
where the yes/no response is assigned to all members of the household whether or not they
receive direct assistance from the program. The unemployment rate in Figure 1 is the seasonally
adjusted average monthly unemployment rate for individuals age 16 and older constructed by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series ID 14000000.
The assumption implicit in this paper is that if any member of the household receives
SNAP then the entire household unit benefits because of resource pooling, which is consistent
with the Bergson-Samuelson formulation of household utility maximization. The Census also
asks the following question (HNUMFS for 1980-1986; HFOODNO for 1987-2011) conditional
on an affirmative response to SNAP receipt:
“How many of the people now living here were covered by food stamps during
[19XX/20XX] (last year)?”
As a check on the trends in SNAP reported in Figure 1, in Appendix Figure 1 I show trends in
individual-level SNAP participation rates using the ASEC alongside an adjusted ASEC series
were I multiply each weight by the ratio of the number of SNAP Recipients to the number of
Household Members to adjust for the fact that not all members directly receive assistance. I also
depict a series constructed using average monthly participation in the fiscal year from FNS
administrative data obtained from http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/SNAPsummary.htm (the ratio of
average monthly participation to the population estimate from the ASEC). Appendix Figure 1
shows that from 1980 to the mid 1990s SNAP participation using the definition here results in
higher rates relative to both administrative data and the adjusted ASEC series. From 1996-2003,
and again in 2008-2010, the definition here coincides with administrative rates, but there is a
greater separation in levels of participation in the adjusted ASEC, which seems consistent with
increased rates of under-reporting (Wheaton 2007; Meyer and Goerge 2011). However, there are
no substantive differences in the trends whether assigning all members to SNAP, or using the
adjusted series, compared to trends in participation from administrative data.
Figure 2 in the text depicts trends in real household median income and inequality. For
this series I use total household income (which includes family income plus income, both earned
and unearned, of nonfamily members, defined by variables HHINCTOT for 1980-1986 and
HTOTVAL for 1987-2011) and deflate it by the personal consumption expenditure deflator
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using 2011 as the base year obtained from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/erp2013/ERP2013_Appendix_B.pdf.
Because all members of the household are assigned the same total income, I restrict attention to
the 2,053,018 household heads across the sample period. For each year I construct median real
household income, real income at the 10th percentile, and real income at the 90th percentile, and
construct the measure of real inequality using the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentiles.
Figure 3 shows trends in SNAP participation by age category (A-AGE). As in Figure 1,
SNAP is determined at the household level, and thus Figure 3 reflects the participation rates of
members of those households by age. Figure 4 then conditions on household participation in
SNAP and using person-level data computes the age composition of the SNAP caseload.
Figure 5 focuses on SNAP households and decomposes the caseload based on household
size (NUM-PERS for 1980-1986; H-NUMPER for 1987-2011).
Figure 6 depicts trends in the fraction of households containing multiple generations,
both across the entire population and conditional on SNAP status. For each year I identify each
unique household using the household sequence number (PPSEQNUM for 1980-1987; PH-SEQ
for 1988-2011). Within that household I identify that a grandchild is present if RHHDFMS = 13
for years 1980-1987, and if HHDFMX > 22 and < 35 for years 1988-2011. After 1986 I identify
that a parent of the head is present if A-EXPRRP = 8 and that HHDFMX > 34 and < 46. Prior to
1987 there is no direct classification of a parent of head and thus I proxy this if there is an “other
relative of head in the family” (REL-HEAD = 5 and RHHDFMS > 20 and RHHDFMS < 25)
who is at least 15 years older than the head. A household is multigenerational if it contains the
parent of the adult head or a grandchild of the head.
Figure 7 presents trends in the distribution of SNAP households by employment status of
the household head during the year prior to the survey and coinciding with the period of SNAP
receipt (A-WEWKRS for 1980-1986, WEWKRS for 1987-2011).
Figure 8 is trends in the distribution of SNAP households by education attainment of the
head. For the years 1980-1990 education attainment is derived by the two variables GRADECOM and HIGH-GRD, while for 1991-2011 it is based on A-HGA.
Figure 9 depicts trends in SNAP participation by poverty status of households. A
household is poor if total household income (HHINCTOT for 1980-1986; HTOTVAL for 19872011) is less than or equal to the poverty guideline for a given household size obtained from
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2012/3e.html#table3.e8.
Table 2 data on SNAP participation and household demographics are obtained from the
CPS ASEC. The state-by-year data on the unemployment rate, minimum wage, EITC
parameters, AFDC waivers, TANF implementation, household-size specific SNAP benefits, and
political party of the governor are obtained from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty
Research (UKCPR) State Welfare Database at
http://www.ukcpr.org/EconomicData/Copy%20of%20UKCPR_National_Data_Set_07_01_13.xl
sx. Finally the SNAP policy variables are obtained from the SNAP Policy Database assembled
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by the Economic Research Service in the U.S. Department of Agriculture
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/snap-policy-database.aspx#.UhQQ-ZLVC3I . There are
missing values in 2010-2011 in the main ERS database for the variables call, cap, compdq,
reportsimple, vehexclall, vehexclamt, and vehhexclone. For these I just assumed that the most
recent value (0, 1, or 2 depending on variable) continued to the end of the 2011 fiscal year. The
variables bbce_asset and oapp_esig each record a -9 as a “no” so I replaced these with 0. As
described in the text, for policies that differ based on partial-state or full-state coverage, I
combine the two categories into a single indicator of whether the policy is in operation in the
state and do not distinguish coverage. Appendix Table 1 contains the sample means of the
variables used in the Table 2 regression models.

Appendix Figure 1: Comparison of SNAP Participation Rates in CPS ASEC to
Administrative Data
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Appendix Table 1: Weighted Summary Statistics of Households
in the CPS ASEC, 1980-2011
Standard
Mean
Deviation
SNAP Participation
0.076
0.265
Economy
Unemployment Rate
0.064
0.021
Unemployment Rate (t-1)
0.062
0.021
Unemployment Rate (t-2)
0.061
0.019
Median Income ($1000)
49.612
8.135
HH Income 90-10 Ratio
8.855
1.498
Nonfood Policy
Min. Wage (Max Fed/State)
EITC Subsidy Rate
State has EITC
AFDC Waiver
TANF

6.700
0.123
0.149
0.048
0.506

0.709
0.129
0.356
0.201
0.496

Food Policy
Food Stamp/SNAP ($100)
EBT Issuance
Broad-based SNAP Eligibility
Call Centers (part./full)
Combined Applications
Initiate by Phone (part./full)
Short Certification
Noncitizens SNAP-eligible
Req. Fingerprint (part./full)
Compulsory Disqualification
Online App. (part./full)
Simplified Reporting
Vehicle Assets Excludable
Outreach ($100,000)

3.493
0.446
0.143
0.181
0.121
0.079
0.547
0.117
0.138
0.16
0.13
0.284
0.222
0.363

1.465
0.486
0.342
0.385
0.323
0.269
0.498
0.319
0.345
0.359
0.336
0.444
0.41
1.084

Demographics
Age 15-29
Age 30-44
Age 45-59
Age 60-74
High School Diploma
Some College
College
Black

0.147
0.312
0.261
0.185
0.321
0.237
0.251
0.118

0.354
0.463
0.439
0.388
0.467
0.425
0.434
0.323

30
Other
Hispanic
Household Size
Number children < 18
Multigenerational HH
Female
Married
Metro

0.042
0.085
2.582
0.623
0.047
0.405
0.536
0.784

0.201
0.279
1.459
1.039
0.211
0.491
0.499
0.412

Politics
Governor is Democrat

0.485

0.500

Observations

2053018
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Figure 1: Trends in SNAP Participation and Unemployment Rate
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Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC and BLS data
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Figure 2: Trends in the Level and Inequality of Household Income
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Figure 3: SNAP Participation Rates by Age of Household Member
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Figure 4: Trends in the Age Composition of SNAP Households
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Figure 5: Trends in Distribution of SNAP Households by Size
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Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC data

Year

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

0

36

Figure 6: Trends in Multigenerational Households
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Figure 7: Trends in Distribution of SNAP Households by Employment Status of Head
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Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC data
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Figure 8: Trends in Distribution of SNAP Households by Education Attainment of Head
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Figure 9: Trends in the Distribution of SNAP Households by Income Status
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Table 1: Number of States Implementing SNAP Policy Reforms
Sept. 2000
Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility
2
Broad-Based Eligibility Eliminates Asset Test
2
Call Centers (partial state/full state)
4/2
Combined Applications
1
Working Cases with 1-3 month Recertification
41
Elderly Cases with 1-3 month Recertification
27
Nonearning Cases with 1-3 month Recertification
50
Compulsory Disqualification
15
All SNAP Dollars Redeemed as EBT
32
Initial Application by Phone (partial state/full state)
0/0
Recertify by Phone (partial state/full state)
0/0
Required Fingerprint (partial state/full state)
4/1
All Noncitizen Adult SNAP-eligible
9
Some Noncitizen Adult SNAP-eligible
42
All Noncitizen Child SNAP-eligible
10
Some Noncitizen Child SNAP-eligible
41
All Noncitizen Elderly SNAP-eligible
10
Some Noncitizen Elderly SNAP-eligible
41
Online Application (partial state/full state)
0/0
Online Application Digital Sig. (partial state/full state)
0
Spending on Outreach Efforts
10
Simplified Reporting
0
All Vehicle Assets Excludable
2
Vehicle Assets Limit Higher than Federal
0
Vehicle Assets Excludes At Least One, Not All
2

Sept. 2011
41
38
19/14
17
17
4
26
18
51
41/2
44/3
2/1
3
48
51
0
5
46
29/1
24
35
49
45
2
4

Source: SNAP Policy Database, Economic Research Service, USDA http://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/snap-policy-database.aspx#.Uh3oARtebmc
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Table 2: The Effects of the Economy, Policy, and Demographics on SNAP Participation
(1)
(2)
(3)
Economy
Unemployment Rate
0.4108***
0.2976***
0.1858***
(0.0458)
(0.0537)
(0.0679)
Unemployment Rate (t-1)
0.0225
(0.0744)
Unemployment Rate (t-2)
0.1710**
(0.0664)
Median Income ($1000)
-0.0008***
-0.0007***
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
HH Income 90-10 Ratio
0.0026***
0.0026***
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
Nonfood Policy
Min. Wage (Max Fed/State)
-0.0007
-0.0004
-0.0002
(0.0012)
(0.0012)
(0.0012)
EITC Subsidy Rate
-0.1027***
-0.1026***
-0.1026***
(0.0092)
(0.0092)
(0.0091)
State has EITC
0.0031
0.0032
0.0028
(0.0026)
(0.0024)
(0.0024)
AFDC Waiver
-0.0033
-0.0029
-0.0036
(0.0028)
(0.0025)
(0.0023)
TANF
-0.0138***
-0.0111***
-0.0108***
(0.0032)
(0.0037)
(0.0032)
Food Policy
Food Stamp/SNAP ($100)
0.0191***
0.0191***
0.0191***
(0.0017)
(0.0017)
(0.0017)
EBT Issuance
-0.0002
0.0010
0.0008
(0.0023)
(0.0020)
(0.0020)
Broad-based SNAP Eligibility
0.0059**
0.0059**
0.0058**
(0.0026)
(0.0023)
(0.0023)
Call Centers (part./full)
-0.0011
-0.0020
-0.0018
(0.0021)
(0.0019)
(0.0018)
Combined Applications
0.0010
0.0007
0.0008
(0.0026)
(0.0026)
(0.0025)
Initiate by Phone (part./full)
-0.0034
-0.0021
-0.0017
(0.0025)
(0.0022)
(0.0022)
Short Certification
0.0012
0.0008
0.0005
(0.0015)
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
Noncitizens SNAP-eligible
0.0009
0.0021
0.0016
(0.0029)
(0.0030)
(0.0030)
Req. Fingerprint (part./full)
-0.0042*
-0.0065***
-0.0071***
(0.0021)
(0.0022)
(0.0022)
Compulsory Disqualification
0.0021
0.0011
0.0012
(0.0020)
(0.0020)
(0.0020)

42
Online App. (part./full)
Simplified Reporting
Vehicle Assets Excludable
Outreach ($100,000)
Demographics
Age 15-29
Age 30-44
Age 45-59
Age 60-74
High School Diploma
Some College
College
Black
Other Race
Hispanic
Household Size
Number children < 18
Multigenerational HH
Female
Married
Metro
Politics
Governor is Democrat

Observations

0.0011
(0.0021)
0.0083**
(0.0031)
-0.0007
(0.0020)
-0.0017*
(0.0009)

0.0013
(0.0018)
0.0074**
(0.0030)
-0.0013
(0.0021)
-0.0017*
(0.0009)

0.0011
(0.0018)
0.0075**
(0.0028)
-0.0009
(0.0021)
-0.0016*
(0.0009)

0.0712***
(0.0075)
0.0223***
(0.0050)
0.0365***
(0.0045)
0.0337***
(0.0029)
-0.0873***
(0.0041)
-0.1138***
(0.0048)
-0.1361***
(0.0061)
0.0969***
(0.0056)
0.0238***
(0.0027)
0.0322**
(0.0150)
-0.0085***
(0.0024)
0.0540***
(0.0021)
0.0379***
(0.0033)
0.0422***
(0.0019)
-0.0886***
(0.0034)
-0.0185***
(0.0024)

0.0712***
(0.0074)
0.0223***
(0.0050)
0.0366***
(0.0045)
0.0337***
(0.0029)
-0.0873***
(0.0041)
-0.1138***
(0.0048)
-0.1361***
(0.0061)
0.0969***
(0.0056)
0.0238***
(0.0027)
0.0322**
(0.0150)
-0.0085***
(0.0024)
0.0539***
(0.0021)
0.0379***
(0.0033)
0.0421***
(0.0019)
-0.0886***
(0.0034)
-0.0184***
(0.0024)

0.0712***
(0.0074)
0.0223***
(0.0050)
0.0366***
(0.0045)
0.0337***
(0.0029)
-0.0873***
(0.0041)
-0.1138***
(0.0048)
-0.1360***
(0.0061)
0.0969***
(0.0056)
0.0238***
(0.0027)
0.0322**
(0.0150)
-0.0085***
(0.0024)
0.0539***
(0.0021)
0.0379***
(0.0033)
0.0421***
(0.0019)
-0.0886***
(0.0034)
-0.0184***
(0.0024)

0.0032***
(0.0010)

0.0034***
(0.0009)

0.0032***
(0.0009)

2053018

2053018

2053018
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Table 3. Simulations of the Effects of the Economy, Policy, and Demographics on Changes in Household Participation in SNAP
Calendar Years 2007-2011
Economy Fixed at 2007 Levels

Non-Food Policies Fixed at
2007 Levels

Food Policies Fixed at 2007
Levels

Demographics Fixed at 2007
Levels

Actual
Change (%)

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Economy

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Non-Food

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Food

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Demographics

68.7

35.8

47.8

67.6

1.6

49.1

28.5

71.2

-3.7

Calendar Years 2000-2011
Economy Fixed at 2000 Levels

Non-Food Policies Fixed at
2000 Levels

Food Policies Fixed at 2000
Levels

Demographics Fixed at 2000
Levels

Actual
Change (%)

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Economy

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Non-Food

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Food

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Demographics

106.6

58.2

45.4

103.3

3.1

68.8

35.4

111.9

-5.0

Calendar Years 1980-2011
Economy Fixed at 1980 Levels

Non-Food Policies Fixed at
1980 Levels

Food Policies Fixed at 1980
Levels

Demographics Fixed at 1980
Levels

Actual
Change (%)

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Economy

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Non-Food

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Food

Predicted
Change

Share due to
Demographics

33.9

21.4

37.0

61.6

-81.5

8.1

76.2

52.9

-55.8

Source: Author’s calculations based on parameter estimates in Table 2, column (3). Simulations hold identified variables fixed and
allow others to vary over time. In each case, the year effects are allowed to vary over time. Shares do not sum to 100% since some
factors are omitted.

